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Abstract: Pervasive systems, that is roughly speaking systems that can interact
with their environment, are increasingly common. In such systems, there are many
dimensions to assess: security and reliability, safety and liveness, real-time re-
sponse, etc. So far modelling and formalizing attempts have been very piecemeal
approaches. This paper describes our analysis of a pervasive case study (MATCH,
a homecare application) and our proposal for formal (particularly verification) ap-
proaches. Our goal is to see to what extent current state of the art formal methods
are capable of coping with the verification demand introduced by pervasive systems,
and to point out their limitations.
Keywords: pervasive systems, modelling, formalizing, verification
1 Introduction
Pervasive systems (often also termed ubiquitous systems) are increasingly common. But what
are they? One of the many definitions is that
Pervasive Computing refers to a general class of mobile systems that can sense their
physical environment, i.e., their context of use, and adapt their behaviour accord-
ingly [PSHC08].
While there are very many forms of pervasive system, they are often:
• mobile and autonomous;
• distributed and concurrent;
• interacting and interactive;
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• reactive and potentially non-terminating; and
• composed of humans, agents and artifacts interacting together.
Existing pervasive systems provide services to the inhabitants of a home, the workers of an office
or the drivers in a car park. We know that requirements for current and future pervasive systems
involve great diversity in terms of their types of services, such as multimedia, communication or
automation services.
Typical Example. As we walk into a shopping area, our intelligent clothing interacts wire-
lessly with shops in the area and then with our mobile phone to let us know that our shoes are
wearing out and that the best deals nearby are at shops ‘X’, ‘Y’ and ‘Z’.
Our PDA, which holds our shopping list, also interacts with our phone to suggest the optimum
route to include shoes in our shopping.
At the same time, our PDA interacts with the shopping area’s network and finds that one of
our friends is also shopping − a text message is sent to the friend’s mobile/PDA to coordinate
shopping plans and schedule a meeting for coffee at a close location in 15 minutes.
Even in this simple example the components at least need capabilities to carry out:
• plan synchronisation;
• spatial reasoning and context-awareness;
• planning and scheduling;
• mobility and communication, etc.
The above is an example but there are many more, often more complex examples1. What is of
concern to us is that pervasive computing is increasingly used in (safety, business, or mission)
critical areas. This, of course, leads us to the potential use of formal methods in this area. Again,
even considering the simple example above there are many dimensions to assess: security and
reliability; safety and liveness; real-time response, etc.
Although there have been some attempts at modelling, e.g. [CFJ03, WZGP04, HI04, SB05,
Sim07], formalising and even verifying aspects of pervasive and ubiquitous systems, e.g. [DKNP06],
these have been very piecemeal approaches. We wish to be able to analyse the varied behaviours
of a pervasive system from a number of viewpoints.
But how might this be achieved? This paper describes our analysis of a pervasive case study,
MATCH [CM07], and our proposals for formal (particularly verification) approaches.
As we have seen, pervasive systems have some quite complex specification aspects. This
explains, in part, why the verification of such systems is difficult. Essentially, most pervasive
systems involve many dimensions that we must address (formalise and verify) simultaneously:
1 See Personal and Ubiquitous Computing journal (Springer); Pervasive and Mobile Computing journal (Elsevier);
Journal of Ubiquitous Computing and Intelligence (American Scientific Publishers); International Journal of Ad Hoc
and Ubiquitous Computing (Inderscience Publishers); and Journal of Ubiquitous Computing and Communication
(UBICC publishers).
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• autonomous behaviour of agents;
• uncertainty in communications;
• teamwork, collaboration and coordination;
• organisations, norms, societal interactions;
• uncertainty in sensing;
• real-time aspects;
• etc...
In addition, such systems often involve humans within the system which directly affect the sys-
tem’s behaviour.
Current state of the art formal methods appear incapable of coping with the verification de-
mand introduced by pervasive systems, primarily because reasoning about such systems requires
considering quantitative, continuous and stochastic behaviour. We also require to prove interac-
tion properties which are quite subtle to express.
2 MATCH overview
MATCH (Mobilising Advanced Technology for Care at Home) is a collaborative research project
focused on technologies for care at home. The overall aim of MATCH is to develop a research
base for advanced technologies in support of social and health care at home. The client users for
MATCH will include older people and people with disabilities of all ages. The goal is to enable
people to manage their health and way of life so that they can continue to live independently in
their own homes for longer.
The main aim of the research in the MATCH project is to integrate a number of home-care
technologies into one system that can be installed into a user’s home. This system will provide
support and assistance where needed by realising a number of goals. Goals may include “Warn
the user if they are doing something dangerous”, “Call for help if the user has an accident and
needs assistance”, “Inform a medical professional if the user’s health deteriorates”.
This could be implemented as a rule based, event driven pervasive system in which a set of
input components such as: motion detectors, RFID readers, temperature sensors, heart monitors,
and microphones, and enable the detection of significant events. A set of output components
such as: speakers, GUIs, mobile devices, TVs, lights, and tactile devices, allow the system to
interact with the environment. A set of rules will determine under what circumstances the system
should take action and what action should be taken.
A significant factor in whether such a system would be adopted within a home would be the
issue of trust. Therefore, it would be advantageous if properties of the MATCH system could
be verified. This would then provide support to the claims made by the system developers.
Properties of interest can be categorised as (but not limited to) Security, Safety and/or Usability.
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2.1 Security
Security properties relate to the integrity of the system and its ability to withstand the efforts
of malicious agents. As an example the property “Food delivery staff cannot see mental health
records” is concerned with the user’s confidentiality. It would be advantageous if the food deliv-
ery staff could have limited access to the homecare system. This could be used to find relevant
information about the user, such as dietary requirements. However, it would not be reasonable
for all of the user’s confidential medical records to be divulged to anyone who interacts with the
system. Another example, “Medical records are consistent across the system” relates to system
integrity. Because of the distributed nature of a pervasive system, there maybe several different
devices used to monitor and record the medical condition of the user. A number of these devices
may hold similar or overlapping data. It should be the case that all such data is consistent. “Cor-
respondence between the system view of events and the events taking place on portable devices”
is another integrity property. It is unlikely that portable devices will have complete knowledge
of the state of the system. However, they should act in a manner that corresponds to the current
state of the system as a whole. “No unauthorised tracking” is a property which is concerned with
confidentiality. It should not be possible for a malicious agent to use system outputs to allow
them to track the user.
2.2 Safety
Safety properties relate to situations in which the system may cause harm, either by action or
inaction. For example, “Sensors are never offline when a patient is in danger”. The system
should always have sufficient sensor coverage to detect all potentially dangerous situations that
it can be reasonably expected to recognise. If the system does detect that a patient is in danger
then appropriate action should be taken. The action taken should have an expected response
time that is appropriate for the situation. For example, if the patient is having a heart attack
then an ambulance should be called. Other forms of notification such as e-mail are unlikely
to be received in time. This could be represented by the property “If a patient is in danger,
assistance should arrive within a given time”. Properties such as “No component will perform
an action that it believes will endanger the patient” can relate the hardware devices used within
the system. A more traditional property, “Urgent actions related to the patient’s safety will
always take precedence over all other actions” ensures that important actions are prioritised. It
is also important to consider potentially damaging actions a user may attempt, “Users have no
reasonable strategy for cooperating to falsify records or events”. This property aims to prevent
users from being able to manipulate the system so as to deceive a health professional.
2.3 Usability
Usability properties refer to aspects that directly affect the user’s experience and interaction with
the system. Example properties include, “Notifications occur only at appropriate intervals and
in appropriate circumstances”. If a user is bombarded with too many insignificant messages or
is interrupted while busy, they are likely to find the system obtrusive and will probably reject it.
Similarly “Requests to the users must be relevant to them” and “There should not be to many
pending requests on a user/patient” also relate to the users’ acceptance of the system.
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3 Some sample properties
In this section we will recall the earlier sample properties of the MATCH system, and formulate
them using formal languages. In particular, we consider formal languages for which a model
checking or verification tool is available.
Below we consider an informal and formal account of the relevant properties.
3.1 Security
3.1.1 Formalisation
Food delivery staff cannot see mental health records. In order to formalise this property we
could use the access control language RW of [GRS04]. In that system, we assume predicates
such as
f d(X) : X is a member of food delivery staff
mhr(X ,Y ) : X is the mental health record of Y
td(X ,Y ) : X is a treating doctor for Y
ha(X) : X is a health administrator
Predicates read and write indicate read and write permissions respectively. The following for-
mulae show how such permissions are granted:
read(mhr(X ,Y ),Z) ⇔ Y = Z ∨ td(Z,Y )
write(td(X ,Y ),Z) ⇔ Z = Y ∨ ha(Z)
...
RW can calculate whether a user can manipulate the access control system in order to give
himself the necessary permissions to achieve a goal. In this example, a member of food delivery
staff might be able to read mental health records if he can promote himself to treating doctor. We
can verify that this is not possible by evaluating the query
∀a,b ∈ Agent. r ∈ Record. f d(a) → ¬[a : mhr(r,b)]
This query evaluates whether there is a (perhaps roundabout) sequence of reads and writes re-
sulting in a food delivery staff member a being able to read the health records of some patient
b.
Correspondence between the system view of events and the events taking place on portable
devices. This property is known as injective agreement in Lowe’s hierarchy of authentica-
tion [Low97]. Intuitively, this property states that each time the MATCH system stores some
value v in the record of a patient p, then p’s doctor d has submitted this value v. In the same way,
each time doctor d submits some value v for p’s record to the system, then the MATCH system
should update its state accordingly. This can be expressed in ProVerif’s query language [Bla01]
as follows:
query evin j : evsyst(d, p,v) ==> evin j : evpatient(d, p,v)
query evin j : evpatient(d, p,v) ==> evin j : evsyst(d, p,v)
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The first (resp. second) query is true when, for each executed event evsyst(d, p,v) (resp. evpatient(d, p,v)),
there exists a distinct executed event evpatient(d, p,v) (resp. evsyst(d, p,v)); and evsyst(d, p,v) is
executed before evpatient(d, p,v) (resp. evpatient(d, p,v) is executed before evsyst(d, p,v)).
Non-Authorised tracking (e.g. by strangers outside the house). MATCH’s implementation
will rely on Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) tags attached to patients, in order for the
system to be able to detect if a particular patient is in the house. However, one wouldn’t want
someone outside the house with an RF reader to be able to determine patient’s position. In the
RFID literature [GJP05, Jue06, WSRE03], this security requirement is known as untraceability.
Intuitively, this property states that an attacker cannot link two different identifications to the
system of the same tag (and thus of the same patient). In other words, all tags that identify
themselves to the system look different to an outsider.
This property can be specified in the applied pi calculus formalism. The applied pi-calculus [AF01]
is a language for describing concurrent processes and their interactions. It is based on the pi-
calculus, but adds equations which make it possible to model a range of cryptographic primitives.
We consider RFID protocols that can be expressed in the applied pi calculus as a closed plain
process P
P ≡ ν ñ. (DB | !R | !T )
where
T ≡ νm̃. init. !main
for some processes init and main2. Intuitively, T is the process modeling one tag, and having T
under a replication in P corresponds to considering a system with an unbounded number of tags.
Each tag initialises itself (this includes registering at the database DB and is modelled by init in
T ) and then may execute itself an unbounded number of times. Thus main models one session of
the tag’s protocol. R corresponds to one session of the reader’s protocol, and DB to the database.
We consider an unbounded number of readers, thus R is under a replication in P.
Many properties of security protocols (including untraceability) are formalised in terms of
observational equivalence (≈) between two processes. Intuitively, processes which are observa-
tionally equivalent cannot be distinguished by an outside observer, no matter what sort of test he
makes. This is formalised by saying that the processes are indistinguishable under any context,
i.e. no matter in what environment they are executed.
Let P be an RFID protocol as defined above, P is said to satisfy untraceability if P≈ P′ where
P′ ≡ ν ñ. (DB | !R | !T ′)
and
T ′ ≡ νm̃. init. main
The intuitive idea behind this definition is as follows: each session of P should look to the
intruder as initiated by a different tag. In other words, an ideal version of the protocol, w.r.t.
untraceability, would allow tags to execute themselves at most once. The intruder should then
not be able to tell the difference between the protocol P and the ideal version of P.
2 ν ñ models a sequence of names n1, . . . ,nk restricted to (Db | !R | !T ). In the same way νm̃ denotes a sequence of
names m1, . . . ,m` restricted to (init. !main).
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3.1.2 Verification - at present
Several tools are available for verifying the properties defined above. Considering the first prop-
erty, RW is supported by the AcPeg tool [Zha06] which accepts descriptions of access control
models and evaluates queries. It treats the case that the sets of agents and other resources are
finite (this case is decidable). It is currently not able to deal with non-bounded sets of resources,
a problem known to be undecidable [HRU76].
DynPAL [Bec09] also analyses access control systems of a dynamic nature, similar to RW, and
is more able to treat unbounded systems, but does not handle queries about “read” capabilities.
We expressed the second property in ProVerif’s query language and the third using observa-
tional equivalence. This, in some cases, allows a user to automatically check that a protocol
satisfies these requirements using the tool ProVerif [Bla01]. However, the verification of these
properties is an undecidable problem [DLMS99], and ProVerif isn’t always able to give an an-
swer. It may even introduce false attacks.
For the second property, which is a correspondence property one could use other tools like
Avispa [ABB+05] or Casper [Low98]. In order for these tools to be able to give some results,
only bounded systems are considered. Indeed, when the number of executions of a protocol is
bounded, the verification of many correspondence properties becomes decidable. To the best of
our knowledge, ProVerif is the only tool able in some cases to prove that processes are observa-
tionally equivalent.
3.2 Safety
3.2.1 Formalisation
Sensors are never offline when a patient is in danger. We can, for example, formulate such
a statement using standard linear-time temporal logic (LTL) [Eme90, MP92, Fis07]. We first
capture the notions of sensors being “offline” and patients being “in danger”.
Assume si is a sensor (i∈{1, ..,m}). We define propositions3 fail(si), switch off (si) and offline(si)
as follows: fail(si) denotes that the sensor si fails; switch off (si) denotes that si is switched off;
and offline(si) denotes that si is offline. Now, we assume that if either the sensor fails or it has
been switched off, then it is offline
[(fail(si)∨ switch off (si))⇒ offline(si)], ∀i ∈ {1, ..,m}
future time points”, ‘♦’ means “at some present or future time point”, and ‘©’ means “at the next
time point”.) We now consider the cases where patients are in danger. Assume p j is a patient
( j ∈ {1, ..,n}). We define the following propositions: in danger(p j) denotes that the patient p j
is in danger; high heart rate(p j) denotes that the heart rate monitor of p j has detected p j’s heart
rate to be higher than normal; low activity(pj) denotes that the activity monitors of the patient
p j have detected that p j has moved very little for a period of time; motionless(p j) denotes that
sensors have detected that p j has not moved at all for a period of time. If we assume that a patient
3 While we use a fragment of first-order language, the finiteness of the domain in question ensures that this is
essentially propositional temporal logic.
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is in danger only if either his/her heart rate is higher than normal, he/she has moved very little
with a period of time, or he/she has been inactive (but not in bed) for a while, then
[(high heart rate(p j)∨ low activity(p j)∨motionless(p j))⇒ in danger(p j)]
The truth of predicates such as ‘low activity’ can also be defined in terms of the values of sensors,
together with some real-time and probabilistic constraints.
We can now specify the property “if a patient is in danger sensors never go offline until the
patient is no longer in danger” as follows:
[in danger(p j)⇒ (¬
∨
i∈{1,..,m}
offline(si))U (¬in danger(p j))], ∀ j ∈ {1, ..,n}
Of course, this simple version assumes that the dangerous situation will eventually be resolved.
Let us now consider the second property.
Urgent actions related to the patients’ safety will always take place before other actions As-
sume A is a set of urgent actions, and B is a set of non-urgent actions such that A∩B = /0 (again,
this notion of urgency might well be defined in terms of some priority measure.) We use the
proposition action(a) to denote that the action ‘a’ takes place. Property (ii) states that if a patient
is in danger, a non-urgent action should not take place before an urgent action. This can again be
expressed in LTL as follows:
[in danger(p j)⇒ (¬(
∨
b∈B
action(b) U
∨
a∈A
action(a))U ¬in danger(p j)], ∀ j ∈ {1, ..,n}
This, of course, can be made more detailed and complex, for example if we delve into the prop-
erties of actions.
If a patient is in danger, assistance should arrive within a given time We define the propo-
sition assistance(p j) as denoting that assistance arrives for p j. If the specification were “if a
patient is in danger, assistance should arrive eventually”, then we could formulate this in LTL as
follows:
[in danger(p j)⇒ ♦assistance(p j)], ∀ j ∈ {1, ..,n} .
assistance must be available. Since this is a real-time property, we must extend the logic to
capture this specification. Alternatively, we might use a logic such as TCTL [ACD90]. TCTL
is a branching-time temporal logic, specifically a real-time extension of the logic CTL [CE82],
which can express real-time properties. Thus, (ii) can be expressed in TCTL as follows:
∀[in danger(p j)⇒∀♦≤tassistance(p j)], ∀ j ∈ {1, ..,n}
This formula states that if a patient is in danger, it is guaranteed that some assistance will arrive
within time t. (Note that ‘∀’ here refers to all possible paths through the branching futures.)
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If a patient is in danger, assistance should arrive within a given time with a probability of 95%
This property has both real-time and probabilistic aspects. Therefore, TCTL can no longer be
used. In order to express this specification we can use the logic PCTL [HJ94], which can express
quantitative bounds on the probability of system evolutions. Thus, (iv) can be specified in PCTL
as follows:
P≥0.95[in danger(p j) U ≤t assistance(p j)], ∀ j ∈ {1, ..,n}
No component will take an action that it believes will endanger the patient The property (v)
now includes a situation where each component’s beliefs must be taken into account. This sug-
gests the use of a modal logic which uses possible worlds to capture the beliefs (or knowledge)
that the component/agent has. Temporal Logics of Knowledge or Belief[FHMV96, HMV04]
can be used to express the property (v) as they combine the temporal aspects with a modal logic
of knowledge (or belief). Assume ci (i ∈ {1, ..,C}) is a component agent, and A is the set of all
urgent and non-urgent actions. (v) might be expressed in a temporal logic of belief as:
Kci [¬(
∨
a∈A
action(a)⇒ ♦
∨
j∈{1,..,n}
in danger(p j))], ∀i ∈ {1, ..,C}
3.2.2 Verification Approaches
There are various verification and model checking tools for the logics we introduced in the previ-
ous section. The properties (i)-(v) can be verified using a suitable model checker or verification
tool described below.
For the logic LTL some well-known tools are NuSMV [CCGR99], SPIN [Hol03], VIS [Gro96],
TRP++ [HK03]. NuSMV is an extension of the model checking tool SMV [McM93], which is a
software tool for the formal verification of finite state systems. Unlike SMV, NuSMV provides
facility for LTL model checking. Spin is an LTL model checking system, supporting all correct-
ness requirements expressible in LTL, but it can also be used as an efficient on-the-fly verifier
for more basic safety and liveness properties. VIS is a symbolic model checker supporting LTL.
VIS is able to synthesise finite state systems and/or verify properties of such systems, which have
been specified hierarchically as a collection of interacting finite state machines. TRP++ is a res-
olution based theorem prover for LTL. TRP++ is based on resolution method for LTL [FDP01].
The best-known tools for the logic TCTL are UPPAAL [BLL+95] and KRONOS [BDM+98].
UPPAAL is an integrated tool environment for modelling, validation and verification of real-
time systems modelled as networks of timed automata, extended with data types. The tool can
be used for the automatic verification of safety and bounded liveness properties of real-time
systems. KRONOS is a tool developed with the aim to verify complex real-time systems. In
KRONOS, components of real-time systems are modelled by timed automata and the correctness
requirements are expressed in the real-time temporal logic TCTL.
PRISM [HKNP06] and APMC [HLMP04] are tools which can be used to model check PCTL
formulae. PRISM is a probabilistic model checker, a tool for formal modelling and analysis of
systems which exhibit random or probabilistic behaviour. It supports three types of probabilistic
models: discrete-time Markov chains (DTMCs), continuous-time Markov chains (CTMCs) and
Markov decision processes (MDPs), plus extensions of these models with costs and rewards. The
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property specification language is mainly PCTL; however, the tool also supports the temporal
logics CSL and LTL. The “Approximate Probabilistic Model Checker” (APMC) [HLMP04] is an
approximate distributed model checker for fully probabilistic systems. APMC uses a randomised
algorithm to approximate the probability that a temporal formula is true, by using sampling of
execution paths of the system.
Finally, there are tools for tackling the verification of specifications in combined modal and
temporal logics, such as temporal logics of belief or temporal logics of knowledge. Although less
well developed that some of the tools above, these range from deductive approaches [JHS+96,
DFB02] to model checking for such logics [KLP04, GM04, BDFF08].
4 Discussion
4.1 Limitations
In Section 3, we give some example properties of different dimensions, e.g. security and safety,
and describe various tools that can be used in the verification and model checking of these prop-
erties. There are several limitations of these tools and techniques.
As discussed in Section 3.2.1 and Section 3.2.2, different formal frameworks and tools are
used to specify and verify different safety properties. For example, we should consider different
temporal logics and model checking tools for real-time aspects, probabilistic aspects, belief as-
pects, etc. Unfortunately, there is no standard methods which can be used for all aspects we are
interested in. This makes it difficult to use a certain formal framework for all safety properties.
Another limitation is that each tool requires a different presentation of the model of the system.
As we discussed in Section 3.1.2, there exist several tools that allow us to verify systems w.r.t.
security. However, some security properties of interest in pervasive systems are not supported
well or even at all by these tools. Indeed, while ProVerif (to name only one) is very efficient
for verifying correspondence and reachability properties like injective agreement, it seems to
reach its limits when used for verifying observational equivalence, and thus properties like un-
traceability. This is due to the fact that ProVerif considers a stronger relation than observational
equivalence introducing in practise many false attacks.
All the existing tools for verifying systems w.r.t. security abstract away from real time, fo-
cusing only on the sequencing of events. Although this has many advantages, it is a serious
limitation for reasoning about protocols such as distance bounding protocols, which rely on real
time considerations. These protocols are often implemented in RFID-based systems, and thus
in many pervasive applications, in order to prevent relay attacks. Modelling time will thus be
necessary for reasoning about pervasive systems.
In the same way, some features of many protocols designed to achieve the above mentioned
requirements are not efficiently handled by existing tools. In particular, ProVerif is also ineffi-
cient for systems with local non-monotonic mutable states. But, protocols which aim to enforce
untraceability often rely on such states. More precisely, ProVerif handles all states as monotonic
introducing again false attacks.
As far as tools for verifying access control systems are concerned, the biggest limitation would
be, as we already mentioned in section 3.1.2 that they usually cannot deal with unbounded access
control models. Moreover, it is difficult to express and model integrity constraints in these tools.
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Finally, we have introduced three existing theories for formally specifying security properties,
namely RW, ProVerif’s query language, and observational equivalence. It is important to note
that they involve different levels of abstraction. Indeed, one can reason at the access control
policy level, or at some symbolic model for protocols level, or even at the implementation level.
It will be very important, to link these levels in order to transfer results from more abstract levels
to more concrete ones.
4.2 Our Approach
As mentioned, a pervasive system might have quite complex specification aspects. Most per-
vasive systems involve many dimensions that must be formalised and verified simultaneously.
Some of the dimensions that are common in pervasive systems are real-time aspects, uncertainty
in sensing and communication, teamwork, collaboration and coordination, organizations, norms
and social interactions, autonomous behaviour of agents, etc.
Current state of the art of formal methods appears incapable of coping with the verification
demand introduced by pervasive systems, because reasoning about such systems requires com-
binations of multiple dimensions such as quantitative, continuous and stochastic behaviour to
be considered, and requires proving properties which are quite subtle to express. For example,
[Zah09, KZF09] show that some simple properties of a typical pervasive system can be verified
using a single verification tool; but a single verification approach cannot be used in verification
of more complex properties involving different dimensions.
Generally speaking, while the formal description of pervasive systems is essentially multi-
dimensional, we generally do not have verification tools for all the appropriate combinations. It
is very clear that developing a framework covering all these dimensions is almost impossible, or
verification over very complex frameworks is very challenging.
In order to tackle the challenge of pervasive system verification, we aim to combine the power
of established verification techniques, notably model checking, deduction, abstraction, etc. In
particular, we are currently working on a generic framework for the model-checking of com-
bined logics, including logics of knowledge, logics of context, real-time temporal logics, prob-
abilistic temporal logics, etc. This work is based on the work of [FMD04], where a framework
is given for the model-checking of combined modal temporal logics. This framework does not
capture complex logics, which are quite essential in specifying different dimensions of pervasive
systems. We therefore will extend this approach to provide a coherent framework for the for-
mal analysis of pervasive systems. We will then apply the new technique to the verification of
combined properties of a sample pervasive system, e.g. MATCH.
5 Conclusion
This paper describes our analysis of a pervasive case study, MATCH. As an initial step, we
formally specify some safety and security properties of the MATCH system. We discuss to what
extent current state of the art formal methods are capable of coping with the verification demand
introduced by pervasive systems, and we point out their limitations. We also give an account of
our proposal for formal verification of pervasive systems.
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